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9-11 AND THE SECRET FISA COURT: FROM WATCHDOG TO LAPDOG?
Jeremy D. Mayer*
In August 2001, the FBI arrested Zacarias Moussaoui, a French citizen
of Moroccan descent, for violating his visa. Moussaoui had been enrolled in
a Minnesota flight school, and had attracted the suspicion of his instructors
because he only wanted to practice on jumbo jets, and only wanted to
practice flying, not taking off or landing. The FBI wanted to search his
computer, and applied to the Justice Department for a Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) warrant.
The Justice Department did not forward the warrant request to the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) because the evidence
linking Moussaoui to Al Qaeda was too weak and fragmentary. September
11 th, however, provided more than enough grounds for a traditional
warrant. When the FBI opened the computer, they found information
suggesting Al Qaeda was planning a large operation that involved hijacking
airplanes.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, less than a month after 9-11, Congress passed
the USA PATRIOT Act, which expanded the government's powers under
FISA. Clearly, some in Congress and President Bush's Administration felt
that the current limits on government surveillance were too restrictive to
successfully defend the nation against terror. The Moussaoui case seemed
to be exhibit one in the argument that our government was fighting terror
with one hand tied behind its back.
An examination of FISA's operations prior to 9-11, however, suggests
that the judiciary has been an inadequate watchdog on our government's
domestic surveillance, and the changes wrought to the law will only make
things worse. In many ways, the judiciary has become little more than a
rubberstamp to the executive's trashing of the Fourth Amendment in the
name of national security.
ORIGINS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
The FISC began life as a reform, an attempt to put a judicial check on
executive abuse of wire-tapping and surveillance. The exposure of these
abuses in the 1970s shocked the Congress, and embarrassed the nation.
Several sinister programs, including the FBI's COINTELPRO, the NSA's
Shamrock and Minaret, and the CIA's CHAOS, were shown repeatedly to
have violated the privacy of thousands of innocent American citizens.
Some of these programs even involved infiltration and subversion of legal
domestic political groups.
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How to stop these unconstitutional abuses and yet preserve the
executive's ability to safeguard national security in a dangerous world was
the dilemma before Congress in the 1970s. Some wanted to simply apply
the Fourth Amendment to domestic surveillance of foreign agents. Others
argued that requiring traditional search warrants before monitoring foreign
spies and domestic traitors would leave us open to massive espionage.
From these two warring viewpoints emerged FISC, a panel of seven federal
judges appointed by the chief justice of the Supreme Court to seven year
non-renewable terms, staggered so that today, a new judge enters the court
each year.
The judges serve brief rotations in Washington, typically alone,
approving or denying government request for surveillance. There is a
system of appeal to a three judge panel, but as only one of more than
10,000 requests has ever been turned down (and that at the request of the
executive branch) there has never been an appeal.
STANDARDS
By what standards has the FISC judged the government's applications
for surveillance authority? According to 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804-5, the Justice
Department must show why they believe the target of surveillance is the
agent of a foreign power, why high ranking executive officials believe the
information is relevant to ongoing foreign intelligence monitoring, and why
less intrusive means cannot be used. The government must also specifically
outline the manner in which the order will be implemented. The court is
supposed to apply the standard of probable cause to the government's
claim, but the entire process is radically different from criminal wiretap
warrants.
Moreover, the agencies are not required to report back on their
conduct to the court. No one ever knows if the government minimized the
invasion of the privacy of non-targeted innocents, as the law commands.
The court itself makes almost no report of its activities, except to tell
Congress annually how many orders for surveillance were requested and
how many were granted. In rare instances, a defendant in a criminal trial
makes a motion for suppression of evidence obtained under a FISA order.
In that case, the trial judge may examine the government's claims in camera
and ex parte. Non-disclosure is the norm. And when a warrant fails to lead
to any court proceedings, as is most common, there is never any disclosure
to the targets or to any other governmental authority that surveillance
occurred.
The scope and use of the FISA has grown exponentially since 1978.
For instance, during the Clinton administration, the FISA was amended so
that break-ins to plant listening devices would be covered.
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POST 9-11 CHANGES AND CHALLENGES
The USA PATRIOT Act extends the scope of FISA's power in a
number of ways. First, the length of a FISA warrant has changed from 45
days to 120, with the possibility of a one-year extension. The FISC court
can now approve wiretaps and break-ins when foreign intelligence is
merely a "significant" part of the operation, rather than its focus. The Act
also calls for unprecedented intelligence sharing among domestic and
foreign agencies, breaking the wall so carefully erected in the 1970s
between domestic crime fighting and foreign intelligence gathering.
Perhaps most ominously, the number of the judges on the court is expanded
to eleven, suggesting that the government intends to greatly increase its
usage of the FISC.
Why should we care about the FISA and the FISC? Imagine that you
have rented a room to a Libyan student covered by a FISA warrant. With
the permission of a federal judge, agents of the government secretly break-
in to your house and plant listening devices in the walls and on your
phones. After a year's monitoring of all emails, phone calls, and
conversations in the house, the FBI determines that your renter is merely a
strong advocate for Palestinian rights, and has no connection to terrorist
groups or foreign governments. The agents remove the listening devices,
and stop monitoring your house. In all likelihood, you will never know
they were there. However, under the newly revised FISA, it is possible that
information from the surveillance will be shared with domestic police
agencies.
When the Founders wrote the Fourth Amendment, they were quite
conscious of the tendency of governments to invade the privacy of citizens
during times of war and conflict. It was that specific concern that led to the
Fourth Amendment protections we have today. FISA violates those
principles, and FISC implicates the judiciary in the violation. Yes, our
country must combat espionage and terror, and to do that, we must monitor
foreign agents and their accomplices. But the FISA system was
fundamentally flawed prior to 9-11, and has only gotten worse since then.
Once the passions of 9-11 cool, Congress must launch a full investigation
of how FISA has operated since it was created.
Perhaps the most frightening aspect of the current surveillance system
is that there is no effective watchdog, and no disclosure of methods. It is of
course possible that the government has not abused the broad and
unchecked powers of FISA in the more than 10,000 times a supine court
has granted warrants. But considering the horrors found by Congress in the
1970s when it finally learned what had been done to US citizens in the
name of national security, it seems unlikely. When we discover what our
government has been doing with the secret approval of federal judges, we
may again be shocked.
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Such disclosures are years away, since the current political climate
makes it highly unlikely that Congress will investigate, much less reform,
FISA. As Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist Paper 8, in times of fear,
the public "to be more safe... become[s] willing to run the risk of being less
free." Thus, it is a responsibility for the unelected federal judiciary to take
the unpopular step of turning the FISC back into the watchdog it was
intended to be.
The FISC appointing chief justices, Burger and Rehnquist, have not
been known as zealous defenders of privacy against government intrusion.
Perhaps the success rate for government requests for warrants would not be
nearly one-hundred percent if FISC had been appointed by Justice Stephen
Breyer, or even Justice Antonin Scalia (a conservative jurist usually more
suspicious of government than Rehnquist). Will the four new FISC judges
balance the legitimate need for surveillance of terrorists with the
constitutional demand of limited police power and citizen privacy? The
judges of this secret court will have a great, if hidden, influence on
determining whether the liberty and privacy of Americans will be the
unnecessary victims of the terrorist acts of 9-11.
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